Abstract: On January 23, 1989, 42 operatives of a revolutionary group, the Movimiento Todos por la Patria (MTP), attacked the General Belgrano Mechanized Infantry Regiment No. 3 at La Tablada in the province of Buenos Aires. This article analyzes the accusations of human rights violations committed by the armed forces and the police on the attackers in the aftermath of the assault; the skeptical Argentine government's response to those allegations before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR); and the commission's conclusions in its 1997 report. It discusses these developments considering a long-term degradation of civil rights in Argentina, and thus, of the meaning of citizenship itself. The report posed electrifying questions in a country grappling with a nascent democracy and the stalled prosecution of dictatorship human rights abusers. A decade and a half into Argentina's longest period of democratic rule in more than half a century, the IACHR report posed and answered a question that remained glaringly unanswered in Argentina: At what point does a democratic state assume responsibility for the human rights violations of the institutions it governs, notably the police and the military? 
launched a failed coup attempt at the Villa Martelli military base, one in a sequence of such risings after the return of democracy in 1983 (Lofredo 1996) .
As television stations began carrying news of the attack as it unfolded, Argentines at first believed that the attackers were yet another group of disgruntled military officers trying to reinstate military rule. The larger context was a growing sense of disillusion in Argentina with the government of president Raúl Alfonsín, which had been unable or unwilling to prosecute the clear majority of soldiers accused of dictatorship crimes. Fascinating as they are, this article is not concerned in the first instance with the motives for the attack or the political ramifications of a brief, isolated throwback to 1970s violence in a climate of mounting economic uncertainty in the late 1980s, seemingly reminiscent of the preceding decade. Rather, it focuses on a specific set of events during the assault, their reading by the Argentine government before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), the commission's judicial rendering in a 1997 report, and what all of it says of the long-term degradation of civil rights in Argentina-or the rights of citizens and thus, the meaning of citizenship itself.
As armed conflict unfolded over 30 hours on January 23-24, more than 3,000 soldiers and police officers staged a counter-attack. Once the insurgents had been defeated and the dust had settled accusations and counter-accusations of criminality and international law violations quickly followed. Eduardo Navascues, a member of the Third Infantry Regiment accused his MTP captors of torture. In 2004, the retired non-commissioned officer José Almada alleged that members of the Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE) (the sinister federal intelligence unit with strong dictatorship ties) of having tortured two MTP prisoners during the recapture of La Tablada. More serious still, human rights groups and MTP operatives who survived the attack denounced the summary execution of four MTP operatives after the MTP had ostensibly offered to surrender their positions, the disappearance of six more, and the use of white phosphorous by the military in the counter-attack, a chemical weapon banned by international law (Amnesty International 1990).
On October 5, 1989, the Federal Court of Appeals for San Martín convicted 20 MTP insurgents to prison sentences ranging from 10 years to life. MTP survivors appealed to the Supreme Court, which rejected the plea two years later, and then to the IACHR. The 1998 commission report on the La Tablada attack was a mixed bag of conclusions that, nonetheless, held the Argentine state responsible for the torture and extrajudicial killing of MTP captives after MARLAS, v.1, n.1, p. 77-96 -Jan-Jun 2017 fighting on the base had ceased. As a matter of international law, much of commission deliberations and reasoning hung on whether the attack was a civil insurgency or a military conflict, and at what point in the 30-hour struggle hostilities had come to an end. The case immediately became a significant precedent in international law. In its findings, the IACHR justified its consideration of human rights law (especially, the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights), but in addition, humanitarian law (a new development for the commission). At the time, the Colombian government, which had bristled at a similar IACHR citation of humanitarian law in the 1997 case of Avilán v. Colombia, was among several observers arguing forcefully that humanitarian law was beyond the IACHR mandate (Avilán 1998). 1 International humanitarian law applies to armed conflict and occupation. Its origins are in The Hague Regulations on Laws and Customs of War (1907) and in the four Geneva Conventions (1949) . Humanitarian law governs the treatment of those no longer participating in hostilities, and considers limits on warring parties in methods and means of warfare. Human rights as a matter of international law date to the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). They arose in response to the carnage of the Second World War and a shared international sense of rights to which all people are due. Never legally binding, human rights have a more complicated past in Argentina than does humanitarian law which first came up in the IACHR in 1997 (Tabak 2016) .
Because they are more ambiguously and broadly formulated, human rights are inherently more subject to legal interpretation and change over time. Before 1973, they were largely unknown outside diplomatic and juridical communities, and never applied by a court in Argentina. At the in the 1970s that human rights became both popularly understood in that context and a matter of political debate. With the return of democracy in 1983, human rights were included as a central problem in civic education classes in Argentine schools. This was one component of a popular linkage of democracy to human rights that has persisted to the present (Siede 2016) .
In considering the La Tablada case, the IACHR found that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions trumped attention to human rights law during hours of violent conflict.
"Despite its brief duration," the IACHR report argued, "the violent clash between the attackers and members of the Argentine armed forces triggered application of the provisions of Common Article 3, as well as other rules relevant to the conduct of internal hostilities" (Abella 1998, paragraph 156).
Stated otherwise, the assault on and recapture of the barracks were both military acts. As such, in considering potentially violent abuses and excesses on both sides, human rights (which applied to civilian conflict) were less relevant than humanitarian rights which governed military confrontation.
"When civilians… assume the role of combatants by directly taking part in the fighting," the report continued, "…they thereby become legitimate military targets…. Thus, by virtue of their hostile acts, the Tablada attackers lost the benefits of [civilian legal protections]… against the effects of indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks pertaining to peaceable civilians" (Abella 1998, paragraph 178).
The IACHR concluded, however, that while the insurgents had been legitimate military targets during hostilities, in the same reading of humanitarian law, once wounded or captured, or once they had surrendered, the provisions of Common Article 3 had guaranteed their protection by the Argentine state. In addition, the commission found insufficient evidence that the Argentine military had used an incendiary weapon. Moreover, even had such evidence been found compelling, the report noted that in 1989, there had been no explicit applicable prohibition on the use of incendiary weapons on internal armed conflicts in Argentina. "In this connection, the In the context of how Argentines had been grappling with the last dictatorship (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) regarding the return to democracy, human rights, a pioneering national truth commission, the prosecution (then the pardoning) of military junta leaders, and a host of related problems, the IACHR report posed electrifying questions. Had they been considered by the federal government, (Moir 2003: 189-190; Iguyovwe 2008: 765-766) .
Despite that the commission had found a democratic Argentine government responsible for extrajudicial killings and that during the 1980s, that same government had positioned itself as a human rights leader in the international community, the impact of an IAHRC report on the Argentine judiciary and polity was nil. There are two likely reasons for that underwhelming impact. of social security, the rights of children, and public health as social rights. Many Argentines viewed social rights as superseding the limitations of civil rights. The degradation of civil rights followed in the weakening of the democratic institutions whose first responsibility was the protection of those rights. These included democratic governance, beaten down by military intervention, and a widening perception after 1950 that the police, the courts, and other democratic institutions were failing in their capacity to represent the rights of citizens. That process was accelerated when the military government that came to power in 1976 used constitutional guarantees to defend the de facto regime (Garin 2012; Sheinin 2012, chapter 4) .
Argentine memories of the Raúl Alfonsín presidency during the 1980s and the Carlos
Menem presidency during the 1990s have formed around very real differences. The former is associated with a defense of human rights, the prosecution of dictatorship leaders, and economic collapse. The latter is remembered for Menem's abandonment of a traditional foreign policy distance from the United States and neo-liberal economic policies that included the sell-off of stateowned companies at bargain-basement prices. Even so, they had in common a politics of civil rights and the courts that dovetailed with dictatorship positions in several key areas. Argentina structured its response to the MTP petitioners before the IACHR in a manner that drew on dictatorship approaches to civil rights-starting with the idea that harsh, brutal responses to insurgencies marked the exercise of a constitutionally protected set of civil rights of all citizens. In the defeat of a dangerous insurgency, so the argument went, extraordinary judicial and police MARLAS, v.1, n.1, p. 77-96 -Jan-Jun 2017 means were necessary that could compromise some rights in the short term as a defense of constitutionally guaranteed rights in the long term (Lorenzetti 2011: 104-113; Rapoport 2016) .
Dictatorship to Democracy: The Abrogation Civil Rights
The Alfonsín administration marked a sharp change from dictatorship. Yet, even though human rights became a stated legal, political, and foreign policy emphasis, the government Chamber of Deputies, the project was opposed and defeated by the Senate (which unlike the Deputies, was outside the control of Alfonsín's Radical Party) (Verbitsky 1987: 51-55 ).
More important, while the Alfonsín administration fought golpista tendencies within the armed forces and the longstanding acceptance in much of Argentine society that the military functioned as a political arbiter of last resort, military authority lasted into the 1980s. This was due in part to the government's dependence on constitutional interpretations, military decrees, legal precedent, and laws implemented during the recent dictatorship. That dependence on dictatorship law legitimized the weakening of civil rights under military rule as judicially credible, which in turn weakened Alfonsín's own efforts (in conjunction with the ongoing threat of a military rising and economic decline) to clearly distinguish democracy from military rule on the question of civil rights (Sheinin 2012 ).
In the right to gather, to worship, and to express oneself freely, the constitution guarantees civil rights, as it does in the protection of political rights in the freedom to vote and in representative which protects free speech and free worship (Noia 1985; Guest 1990: 13-15) . The legitimacy of the dictatorship derived from a constitutional response to exceptional leftist insurrection. Article 23 called for a state of siege in times of internal upheaval. "For more than a century the country had never found itself involved in an international conflagration; consequently, it had never suffered a foreign attack or internal chaos equivalent to the current threat from terrorist subversion" (Respuesta del Gobierno 1979).
The military narrative on its having built the coup d'état on constitutional pillars in its supposed defense of civil rights against leftist terrorism was all at once ludicrous and historically credible. Argentine history had regularized military rule to the extent that through the late 1970s, many of those who decried dictatorship understood it as a functional requirement to restore democratic order in the aftermath of crisis. In fact, before 1983, no persistent, effectual legal or political opposition had ever countered military governance as unconstitutional (Rinesi 2016) . A year later, armed assailants kidnapped López who was held for a week at an illicit detention center. He escaped, then turned himself in and was tortured. He confessed to having placed a bomb in the jet (though no bomb was ever found) and to having passed sensitive information on to ERP. Beyond the confession under duress, there was no evidence to establish (López 1987; Gregorio-Cernadas 2016) .
As in the cases of López and Grossman, with regard to José Siderman, the postdictatorship government had a keen interest in upholding dictatorship judicial process. In the case of Siderman, though, the interest was financial and was shared by the Alfonsín and Menem administrations. Explicit to the Alfonsín administration strategy on Siderman was the avoidance of any payment to the family for actions taken by the military government. That strategy was followed to the letter by the Menem administration. This is evident in the latter's prosecution of the case on when its chief counsel estimated that it had spent $700,000 on the case since 1983 and that litigation expenses would continue to escalate exponentially. In short, the government cut its losses in the $6 million payout (Ministerio).
Argentina Before the IACHR: La Tablada
The Grossman, López, and Siderman cases demonstrate the democratic government's willingness to allow dictatorship legal precedent and procedure to shape its policy when expedient and, consequently, to contribute to the denigration of the civil rights of each of the three-and of Argentines more generally. Argentina's response to the La Tablada MTP survivors before the IACHR (Abella 1998) demonstrated that same tendency to depend on dictatorship precedent to set the constitutional parameters of state-sponsored violence. Only this time, in the context of an armed attack that left 39 dead, the stakes were much higher. had no authority to order the military to retake the base. The government countered that the constitution gave the president the authority to intervene because the insurrection was a military operation. In response to a criticism by the petitioners and the IACHR that it had failed to properly investigate the allegations of the petitioners, the Argentine state argued that "if it had considered the offenses alleged as shown and determined the responsibilities on the mere basis of the seriousness of the allegations," it would be violating the constitution, domestic legal norms on criminal procedure, and the American Convention on Human Rights. That argument drew directly on a dictatorship body of legal reasoning that distinguished between those detained by the government in the 1970s through the legal system, the Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (or PEN, the National Executive Authority) and those kidnapped and disappeared illicitly. In the latter case, the dictatorship refused international and domestic requests to investigate disappearances that had not That material too was entered evidence during the trial (Méndez 1991: 76-77 ).
Jardín's documents held information on purported MTP plans to commit several crimes, including politically motivated killings. There was no information provided at the trial on who had provided him the documents; Jardín exercised his legal right to maintain the secrecy of confession (Abella 1998, paragraph 51). In addition, by the provisions of Law 23,077, defense attorneys at the trial were denied access to evidence in the case and were not permitted to challenge the authority of expert witnesses identified by the state. where the army allowed him to walk, and also allowed the army to gather weapons, equipment and other materials" (Abella 1998, paragraph 39). The petitioners identified an abdication of jurisdictional responsibility by Larrambebere in his not having taken charge of collecting and handling evidence on site. Moreover, the judge restricted his investigation to walking through sites pointed out to him by military officials present. As a result, among many procedural problems engendered, information regarding the deaths and wounds suffered by the insurgents was removed from evidence files before the trial (Abella 1998, paragraph 40).
The petitioners argued that they were not tried in an appropriate court. The trial was carried out under special circumstances established by Law 23,077 that established an ad hoc criminal process by which there was no appeal of judgment other than a filing to the Supreme Court. The American Convention on Human Rights guarantees more than one level of appeal. The petitioners argued in addition that the trial was "political and repressive" (Abella 1998, paragraph 43). Applying National Security Doctrine language, the petitioners argued that the attack should be considered "low intensity conflict."
The petitioners reprised a contention from the trial that the attack was not a "rebellion" in the sense identified by article 226 of the Argentine Penal Code (the implication being that there was no unique, militarized nature of the La Tablada assault that might have warranted the invocation of Law 23,077). The petitioners claimed to have been motivated by the constitution itself and its defense, in the face of the threat of a military coup d'état. They argued further that a "rebellion" required a military structure on the part of the MTP that was lacking, and the objective of disarming the function of the constitution (also lacking). Finally, they claimed it "unthinkable that 40
persons could achieve such a result" (Abella 1998, paragraph 48). To justify its having invoked Law 23,077, the Argentine government presented it as one of a package of legislation adopted to prevent a recurrence of military dictatorship. However, its juridical precedent in Argentina was one that Argentine and international human rights groups had fought-the use of military tribunals by the dictatorship to try civilians accused of "extraordinary" crimes. Like military tribunals under the dictatorship, the courts established by Law 23,077 functioned in a manner that denied constitutionally guaranteed rules of evidence gathering, encouraged an unreasonable participation of military authorities, and denied regular channels of appeal. The state responded to the MTP petition before the IACHR in language whose purposeful ambiguity was reminiscent of equivalent dictatorship approaches to judicial proceedings. Law 23,077 was meant to help build a judicial order "consistent with the republican system of State as embodied by Article 1 of the National Constitution" (Abella 1998, paragraph 77). In the uncertain political climate of early 1984, the Argentine government had in mind the possibility of a resurgence of both military golpistas and the leftist insurgencies of the 1970s.
In vague terms, Law 23,077 targeted aggravated illicit association for those taking part, as well as cooperating or aiding in the formation or maintenance of an illicit association organized to commit crimes that might put at risk the constitution. There was an equally ambiguous mathematical component to the assessment of a threat. To meet the bar of criminality, such an organization would have to have at least two of the following features: at least 10 members, a military organization, a cellular structure, weapons of war or powerful explosives, operation in one or more political subdivisions of the country, one or more officers/non-commissioned armed forces officers, well known ties to similar organizations, or the assistance/direction of public officials. In other words, an organization that were to operate in the province of Catamarca and that consisted of twelve individuals could on those grounds alone be categorized an illicit organization dedicated to criminal insurrection and charged (Abella 1998, paragraph 77).
The way Law 23,077 altered how the criminal code was to treat the crime of rebellion was also ambiguous, opening the door to judicial impropriety. A sentence of 5 to 15 years in prison was determined for those who "rise up in arms to change the Constitution, depose any of the public powers of the national government, exact from it any measure or concession or impede, even temporarily, the free exercise of its constitutional powers or its formation or renovation in legal terms and times" (Abella 1998, paragraph 78) . In this regard, the state claimed to have found documents at MTP offices showing that the insurgents planned to alter the constitution and to overthrow the president, though neither objective was explicitly stated in any document before the San Martín court or the IACHR. Moreover, documents found at MTP headquarters, were collected by military intelligence in a process that, when introduced into their trial proceedings, had denied the defendants their civil rights as outlined in laws that barred the military from playing such a role.
The state's response to the petitioners' multiple claims of civil rights violations in the Argentine trial process was terse, ambiguous, and equivalent to vague language the dictatorship had used in dismissing criticisms of its human rights record. Procedure "adopted under Law 23,077," the Argentine government argued, "is responsive to most modern legislative techniques MARLAS, v.1, n.1, p. 77-96 -Jan-Jun 2017 and chooses at the international level implementation of the oral trial, the procedure that normally signifies, because of its immediacy, the possibility of holding hearings in a pubic manner and a one-level trial (Abella 1998, paragraph 83) . In dismissing the petitioners' appeal of their sentences and court irregularities, the state invoked a tautology citing the opinion of the federal Attorney General (that is to say, an agent of the state itself). The Attorney General rejected, for example, the arbitrary introduction and consideration of evidence at the original trial.
There were other tautological flaws in the state's case before the IACHR. The state disallowed the petitioners' claim that the judge and federal court which took up the case-by the provisions of Law 23,077-were invalid by simply citing Law 23,077. On the better treatment that military officers received-specifically in reference to the 1987 due obedience law (Law 23,521)-the state simply cited the due obedience law and noted that it applied to questions that predated the restoration of democracy in 1983. In reference to president Carlos Menem's pardons of military personnel convicted in the 1980s for their roles in the dictatorship, the state pointed out simply that the pardons fell under presidential authority according to the constitution. The pardons in question were exceptional and as such, entirely discretionary (as though a discretionary authority removed its relevance as a judicial precedent).
Bringing to bear the multiple categories in Law 23,077 that could be used to determine a military rising, the state cited an interview Enrique Gorriarán Merlo gave on 17 May 1995. While his comments could be used to check off several of the stated categories identifying a military rising by the terms of Law 23,077, they negated none of the petitioners' rights claims before the IACHR.
Gorriarán Merlo stated that attack organizers had believed that had they been successful in capturing the military post, Argentines would have responded positively to a call for mobilization "to demand that the government change its economic policy and take a firm stand against military pressures" (Abella 1998, paragraph 110). While the state read those remarks as a potential incitement to government overthrow, the language could also have meant a popular mobilization of the sort Argentines had routinely organized since the return of democracy-popular protests in front of the national congress. Whatever their meanings the comments were scarcely evidence of an intent to subvert the constitution. and Díaz] out and killed them. And there were those who didn't believe that for a moment. Some said that… it was rather clear that the two had died in combat. I can't say that it was exactly fiftyfifty one way or the other, but legally it came to that" (Budassi 2016) . By taking the armed forces at their word even as he had serious doubts about the fates of Díaz and Ruiz, then offering his listless, fifty-fifty non-explanation 23 years later, Nisman sided with an Argentine judiciary that had The commission concluded further that 20 MTP members had been tortured by the state. It found that the Argentine state had had the obligation to investigate allegations of human rights violations. It failed to do so as it did to oversee the autopsies of those killed during the attack.
Conclusion
Autopsies were so poor, the commission concluded that they lacked basic information on whether injuries, fractures, and burns had preceded or followed death. Moreover, the commission found that autopsies on the bodies of MTP members had been carried out less meticulously than those on soldiers also killed during the attack. The state "failed in its obligation to carry out an exhaustive, impartial, and conclusive investigation into the serious allegations" of rights violations (Abella 1998, paragraph 243). Additionally, the criminal procedure identified by Law 23,077 in this case marked a violation of the petitioners' civil right to an appeal.
That the IACHR report had no impact on Argentine police forces, the judiciary, or government policy points to the ongoing failure of the Argentine state to create the sort of chasm between itself and dangers military authority in civil society that had been intended in Law 23,077, and in other legal and policy changes in the 1980s. The political scientist Mercedes S. Hinton argues that the hundreds of human rights violations under democracy by the Buenos Aires provincial police (the Bonaerense) and by other police forces represent the tenuousness of the state's control over its instruments of coercion (Hinton 2005: 75) . In fact, and as the IACHR report argued in 1998, it was and is not so much a question of tenuousness of control as that when state institutions commit rights violations under democracy, they do so as agents of the state. What
